Paraconsistent Multivalued Logic and Coincidentia Oppositorum: Evaluation with Complex Numbers by Usó i Domènech, Josep Lluís et al.
American Journal of Systems and Software, 2015, Vol. 3, No. 1, 1-12 
Available online at http://pubs.sciepub.com/ajss/3/1/1 
© Science and Education Publishing 
DOI:10.12691/ajss-3-1-1 
 
Paraconsistent Multivalued Logic and Coincidentia 
Oppositorum: Evaluation with Complex Numbers 
Usó-Doménech J.L.1, Nescolarde-Selva J.1,*, Pérez-Gonzaga S.1, M. J Sabán2 
1Department of Applied Mathematics, University of Alicante, Alicante, Spain 
2Department of Philosophy, University Rey Juan Carlos, Madrid, Spain 
*Corresponding author: josue.selva@ua.es 
Received December 23, 2014; Revised December 31, 2014; Accepted January 07, 2015 
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to develop a multivalued logic to complex truth values. The sum of truth values being isomorphic to the vector of the 
plane, it is natural to relate the function V to the metric of the vector space R2. We will adopt as valuations the norms 
of vectors. The main objective of this paper is to establish a theory of truth-value evaluation for paraconsistent logics 
with the goal of using in analyzing ideological, mythical, religious and mystic belief systems. 
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1. Introduction 
"Philosophy is a collection of big mistakes, but 
mistakes so seemingly close to an aspect of truth, that they 
require serious consideration as premises, at least until 
their consequences and revelations become temporarily 
exhausted." (Florencio Asenjo, 1985) 
“If … we construe [this statement] as [a statement] 
about a sun which is actually all it is able to be, then we 
see clearly that this sun is not at all like the sensible sun. 
For while the sensible sun is in the East, it is not in any 
other part of the sky where it is able to be. [Moreover, 
none of the following statements are true of the sensible 
sun:] “It is maximal and minimal, alike, so that it is not 
able to be either greater or lesser”; “It is everywhere and 
anywhere, so that it is not able to be elsewhere than it is”; 
“It is all things, so that it is not able to be anything other 
than it is”—and so on.” (Nicholas of Cusa) 
What we need initially is an answer to the question 
“What is a Contradiction?” That can only be had with a 
definition of the term. The English term itself derives from 
the Latin verb contradictio (contradicere), “I speak 
against” (“to speak against”). But the initial definition of 
“contradiction” comes to us from Aristotle. In the Greek 
the term Aristotle used was antiphasis. That term is 
composed of two Greek words. The term anti is a 
preposition. In this use, it means “against.” The second 
term, phasis, comes from the verb phēmi, which means “to 
say, speak or tell.” It connotes the act of expressing 
opinion, thought or belief, and, thus, of having an opinion, 
thought or belief. The term phasis itself means a “saying, 
speech, sentence, affirmation or assertion.” A fair 
etymological definition of the term antiphasis, then, is that 
it means a “saying, speech, sentence, affirmation or 
assertion against.” So Latin and Greek provide the same 
basic meaning. But both leave us with the question against 
what? And we shall answer that in due course. For now, 
however, we need to look at Aristotle’s own definition of 
the term.  
In the current paradigm of consciousness, duality is 
perceived be a binary state of mutual exclusion. One sees 
this notion reflected in human thought and language where 
something must be “either X or Y”, but not “both X and Y”. 
A new paradigm of consciousness is required that no 
longer operates in a “dualistic” notion of “either/or”, but 
one that conveys a “holistic” notion of “both/and”. We 
currently view duality as a disjunctive rather than a 
conjunctive aspect of being. The difference between this 
dualistic and holistic paradigm of consciousness can be 
symbolically expressed in the language of logic. Current 
dualistic paradigm of consciousness ;X Y X Y≠   
(something is either X or Y); a disjunctive exclusion. 
Emerging holistic paradigm of consciousness 
;X Y X Y=   (something is both X and Y); a conjunctive 
inclusion. This conceptual paradigm of viewing the world 
in such an exclusionary and disjunctive dualistic state has 
been programmed into us by an outdated Cartesian 
philosophical worldview and a Newtonian scientific view 
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of the universe. This modern paradigm of dualistic 
thought has been prevalent ever since René Descartes 
proclaimed. That tradition clings to the principle of non-
contradiction, but understood as rejection of contradiction 
hereinafter abbreviated as RC. Well, is paraconsistent any 
approach that rejects this same RC, ie admit that certain 
contradictions can be true (not necessarily all, of course). 
In particular, today is paraconsistent a treatment of 
problems such as a philosophy of religion that 
accommodates certain antinomian assertions and in doing 
so, offered as underlying logic to build theory, not 
classical logic is a logic of Aristotelian stamp, but one of 
the denominated precisely paraconsistent logics. 
It seems to us that the philosophy of paraconsistency 
can propose a concept of modern rationality which will 
enable us to restore and gradually elaborate in never 
ending self-criticism "the vision of the whole" as a co-
evolutionary unity of mankind and Nature. To the basics 
of this modern rationality would belong of the non-
exclusive relation between analytical and dialectical 
thinking, their developmental unity. The desirable 
unifying can be conceived of in various ways. It follows 
from this paper that we are skeptical about the proposal to 
unify analytical and dialectical thinking through a kind of 
reduction of the latter to the first by applying the idea of 
paraconsistency. It would mean to reduce the whole to a 
part. What we propose is to conceive analytical thinking 
as a part of and a derivative from something more 
complex and more fundamental.  
The main objective of the authors is to establish a 
theory of truth-value evaluation for paraconsistent logics, 
unlike others who are in the literature (Asenjo, 1966; 
Avron, 2005; Belnap, 1977; Bueno, 1999; Carnielli, 
Coniglio and Lof D'ottaviano, 2002; Dunn, 1976: Tanaka 
et al, 2013), with the goal of using that paraconsistent 
logic in analyzing ideological, mythical, religious and 
mystic belief systems (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech, 2013a,b, 2014a,b,c; Nescolarde-Selva, Usó-
Doménech and Lloret-Climent, 2014; Usó-Doménech and 
Nescolarde-Selva, 2012).  
2. Historical Perspective 
Numerous paraconsistent logical calculi have been 
constructed which allow the formula P P∧¬  to be true 
(derivable) under some special conditions and thus 
tolerate P P∧¬  without becoming trivial. To provide 
some grounds for this theory let us take a look at 
Aristotle's theory of contrariety from the point of view of 
modern dialectic. This is detailed account of what 
Aristotle calls Antiphasis is to be found in Metaphysics 
Book 4. Aristotle's examples of the four kinds of opposites 
are: double and half', bad and good, blindness and sight 
and he sits and he does not sit. Aristotle was deeply 
interested in investigating the modes of opposition and 
their ontological relevance in the early, middle and late 
period of his philosophizing. He ascribed to the opposites 
an important role in almost all fields of reality, in Nature, 
in society as well as in thought, but disagreed with that 
ontological overestimation of the role of opposites, which 
he found in many preceding Greek thinkers. The second is 
his misinterpretation of Heraclitus in the sense of 
Protagoras' relativism hereby not only the sophistic 
relativism, but also the Heraclitian anticipations of 
dialectical ontology.  
Aristotle is right in insisting that the denial of this 
principle would lead to a kind of total trivialization of 
human thinking and people would become prisoners of a 
helpless tenet "which prevents a thing from being made 
definite by thought. Now let us compare three following 
allegedly synonymous formulations. Aristotle took all 
three as stating the same principle and in different places 
mutually argues the truth of each of them from the 
presupposed evidence of each of them.  
1) "Contradictory propositions are not true 
simultaneously". This statement is, as already mentioned, 
acceptable and respected on the new ontology. 
2) "Contradictories cannot be predicated at the same 
time". This statement would be unacceptable if interpreted 
in the following way: (in the European tradition translated 
as "contradictio") is for Aristotle sometimes the 
conjunction of two sentences (or statements, propositions) 
of which one affirms what the other denies; sometimes 
either part of this conjunction; sometimes the negation of 
any given subject, property, relation, action etc. (e. g. man 
- not-man, changing - unchanging).  
3) "Contraries cannot at the same time belong to the 
same subject" if taken, as Aristotle did, as a general 
principle valid for all entities.  
These opposites are, for Heraclitus, to be taken in unity, 
as constituting in their opposition and unity something 
identical. If sometimes in the dialectical tradition 
Heraclitus' position was characterized as claiming not only 
the unity, but even the identity of opposites, never was the 
Leibnizian identity meant, allowing us to replace one of 
the identical expressions and/or concepts by the other 
mutually and thus to remove completely the opposition.  
A closely related, but more general, acceptation that 
figures in most literary manuals defines paradox as an 
apparent contradiction which, upon examination, actually 
reveals a hidden, startling truth. It is important to stress, 
however, that the apparent contradiction of paradox occurs 
only in the surface meaning of the opposing statements, 
each of which is found to be true in some sense or to a 
certain degree. Paradox therefore uses the language of 
apparent nonsense to express startling «truths» that exceed 
the bounds of logic and propositional discourse. A third 
meaning of paradox is technically called «antinomy»: an 
insoluble contradiction in which asserting the truth of a 
particular proposition necessarily entails asserting that 
proposition's falsity (Quine. 1966). The prototypical 
antinomy is the Paradox of the Liar, which asserts, in 
effect: “This statement is false”. Clearly, if that statement 
if false, it is also true, in the same sense and to the same 
degree. For our purposes here, it is important to bear in 
mind that what renders antinomies insoluble is their 
wholly internal reference and their self-contained quality. 
Beyond their utterly fixed terms, there remains no logical 
or semantic space, and no other level of abstraction, which 
permit an assertion of even partial truth or falsity. One of 
the chief sources of paradox literature in the West is 
Plato's Parmenides. Through a barrage of paradoxical 
utterances, the dialogue not only treats of such eminently 
philosophical questions as “unity and diversity”, “likeness 
and unlikeness” and “being and non-being”. It also 
provides a model of Plato's rhetorical art, including a 
practical model for the training of novice orators. 
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Parmenides says to the young Socrates: There is an art 
which is called by the vulgar «idle talking», and which is 
often imagined to be useless; in that art you must train 
yourself, now that you are young, or truth will elude your 
grasp (Plato, 1973). Parmenides goes on to demonstrate 
that, simply put; this art consists in arguing opposite sides 
of a question. “Truth” is thus shown to lie, not so much 
between, as beyond extremes, each of which is in some 
way deficient, at once partially true and partially false. 
Further, truth is also shown to prove elusive and 
paradoxical, as set forth in the dialogue's startling 
“conclusion” about what the truth seems to be: 
[Parmenides]: Let this much be said; and further let us 
affirm what seems to be the truth, that, whether [the] one 
is or is not, [the] one and the others [plurality] in relation 
to themselves and one another, all of them, in every way, 
are and are not, appear to be and appear not to be. 
[Socrates]: Most true. (Plato, 1973).  
In his Of Learned Ignorance (De docta ignorantia), 
written in 1440, Nicholas of Cusa adopted an equally 
paradoxical approach to questions of truth, albeit within a 
Christian intellectual framework. A clear echo of Socrates' 
knowing only that he knows nothing, and the Pauline 
distinction between worldly and godly wisdom, the title of 
Cusa's first chapter reads: “How Knowledge is Ignorance” 
(Cusanus, 1986). Yet such ignorance becomes 
increasingly «learned», hence increasingly unknowing, 
through reflective contemplation of the created order, 
which unfolds in time as a perplexing admixture of unity 
and plurality, likeness and unlikeness, being and non-
being-a coincidentia oppositorum, or an alternately 
conflicting and harmonious blend of contraries. A source 
of paradox literature is Erasmus' The Praise of Folly. 
Modeled after the classical type of “paradoxical 
encomium”, Erasmus' work seems often to conclude that 
many species of “folly” are wisdom, and that folly is at 
once good and bad, laudable and despicable. Yet the 
viciously circular text resists anything akin to univocal 
interpretation, owing primarily to its status as an 
exaltation of folly pronounced by Folly herself. Indeed, 
the character's declamation presents an extreme case of 
self-reference, self-praise, self-love (philautia) and a lack 
of self-knowledge, which casts even its seemingly 
«truthful» utterances in doubt. 
The doctrine of coincidentia oppositorum, the 
interpenetration, interdependence and unification of 
opposites has long been one of the defining characteristics 
of mystical (as opposed to philosophical) thought. Mystics 
of various persuasions have generally held that such 
paradoxes are the best means of expressing within 
language, truths about a whole that is sundered by the very 
operation of language itself. Any effort, it is said, to 
analyze these paradoxes and provide them with logical 
sense is doomed from the start because logic itself rests 
upon assumptions, such as the principles PNC and PEM, 
that are violated by the mystical ideas. The coincidentia 
oppositorum is a common trope in many religious 
traditions, particularly those with a mystical or initiatory 
aspect:  
“For I am the first and the last, I am the honored one 
and the scorned one; I am the whore and the holy one….” 
(Thunder, Perfect Mind)  
“Being and non-being produce one another. Hard 
depends on easy, long is tested by short, High is 
determined by low.” (Tao Te Ching)  
“The way up and the way down are one and the same.” 
(Heraclitus)  
A modified version of the coincidentia occurs in a 
negative form, in which conjoined pairs of opposites are 
asserted and then rejected as the locus of ultimate truth, 
which is held to be transcendent of the objects of 
discriminating consciousness:  
“The Self is to be described as not this, not that. It is 
incomprehensible, for it cannot be comprehended; 
undecaying, for it never decays; unattached, for it never 
attaches itself, unfettered, for it is never bound. He who 
knows the Self is unaffected, whether by good or by evil.” 
(Brihadaranyaka Upanishad)  
“I prostrate to the perfect Buddha, the best of all 
teachers, who taught that that which is dependently-arisen 
is without cessation, without arising; without annihilation, 
without permanence; without coming, without going; 
without distinction, without identity and peaceful — free 
from fabrication.” (Nagarjuna)  
The problem of the apparent irrationality of the 
coincidentia in Buddhist philosophy was an area of 
intense exegetical concern for Tibetan interpreters of 
Indian Madhyamaka, and the attempt to interpret 
apparently incoherent statements by Nagarjuna and 
Chandrakirti was a central preoccupation of many of 
Tibet’s great scholars. Alternately, in Ch’an and Zen, the 
problem of awareness operating beyond logical categories 
was fervently embraced and the paradoxical quality of the 
language was emphasized.  
Whereas western mystics have often held that their 
experience can only be described in terms that violate 
PNC western philosophers have generally maintained that 
this fundamental logical principle is inviolable. 
Nevertheless, certain philosophers, including Meister 
Eckhardt and G.W.F. Hegel have held that presumed 
polarities in thought do not exclude one another but are 
actually necessary conditions for the assertion of their 
opposites. Hegel (1948) was the last great philosopher to 
hold that the identity of opposites could be demonstrated 
rationally. His view that coincidentia oppositorum yields a 
logical principle was treated with such scorn by later 
generations of philosophers that the idea of finding a 
rational/philosophical parallel to the mystic quest became 
an anathema to serious philosophers. Even W. T. Stace 
(1950, p 213), who was highly sympathetic to mysticism 
eventually, came to the view that in trying to make logic 
out of the coincidence of opposites Hegel fell “into a 
species of chicanery.” According to Stace, “every one of 
[Hegel’s] supposed logical deductions was performed by 
the systematic misuse of language, by palpable fallacies, 
and sometimes…by simply punning on words.” Stace, who 
early on wrote a sympathetic, and now much maligned, 
book on Hegel’s system, gave up the idea that coincidentia 
oppositorum could be shown to be a rational principle, 
holding that “the identity of opposites is not a logical, but 
definitely an alogical idea.”  
The paradoxical nature of the coincidentia oppositorum 
receives primary attention in much contemporary 
exegetical literature in the West. It is often glossed by 
interpreters as an intentional confound to conventional 
logic, which is based on the law of the excluded middle, an 
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axiom of reasoning that holds any given thing must either 
by X or not-X, where X is any possible predicate. The 
emphatic assertion of coincident opposites appears on the 
surface to be a direct challenge to Boolean or Aristotelian 
logic. In the XX century the physicist Neils Bohr 
commented that superficial truths are those whose 
opposites are false, but that “deep truths” are such that 
their opposites or apparent contradictories are true as well. 
The psychologist Carl Jung (1955/56) concluded that the 
“Self” is a coincidentia oppositorum, and that each 
individual must strive to integrate opposing tendencies 
(anima and animus, persona and shadow) within his or her 
own psyche. And the self is in Jung’s view exactly such 
an ultimate ‘central archetype of order’ (Urban 2005) and 
clearly in his view to a coincidentia oppositorum. Jung is 
not saying that the self is divine but rather that it is an 
expression of the Divine: ‘Divineness’ or Divinity (die 
Göttlichkeit) expresses or shapes or moulds (ausdrückt) 
the self in the form of a coincidentia oppositorum. Jung is 
not equating self with Divinity in this passage or saying 
that the self is divine; he is bringing the terms into another 
kind of relation. The idea is that die Göttlichkeit forms and 
shapes (ausdrückt) the self into the pattern of coincidentia 
oppositorum. In other words, the psychological self is 
shaped and conditioned by something with a theological 
title, die Göttlichkeit. The self mirrors the Divinity (at 
least to some degree). This is a non- or post-traditional 
restatement of the familiar Biblical idea that humankind is 
created in the image of God (Genesis 1:27—‘So God 
created man in his own image, in the image of God he 
created him; male and female he created them’) and 
therefore embodies (whether psychologically, mentally, 
spiritually, or even according to some theologians, 
physically) the imago Dei. Jung clearly states a strong and 
intimate relation between the self and die Göttlichkeit 
(both as defined by the phrase, coincidentia oppositorum), 
but they are not identical (Stein, 2008). 
More recently, postmodern thinkers such as Derrida 
(1967, 1980) have made negative use of the coincidentia 
oppositorum idea, as a means of overcoming the 
privileging of particular poles of the classic binary 
oppositions in western thought, and thereby 
deconstructing the foundational ideas of western 
metaphysics. Opposition wave-particle cornerstone of 
quantum mechanics is a good example of coincidentia 
oppositorum.  
In religious texts is often very difficult to resort to 
paraphrase well (if they are paraphrases, that's another 
problem, as they may be explanations and not mere 
paraphrase). It is often swaged with this emphasis, the 
same God and the same context, in relation to the same 
entities and under the same aspect, which is benign and 
malevolent, sweet and angry, fearful and kind, 
inaccessible and accessible, indulgent and severe -not to 
mention thousands of other contradictions that perhaps 
could be susceptible to other reinterpretations, less literal 
and more charitable-, which is implausible given such 
utterances the meaning of mere nuances implicit of 
gradualness  
The more or less obvious meaning of many of these 
texts and discourses seems that God has each pair of 
opposite determinations within a special way, owning one 
as well as another in a high degree. Using the Meinong 
theory of objects (Peña, 1985) will admit as non illogical 
the principle of characterization attributable to Meinong: 
Principle of Characterization: An entity who comes 
presented as being in one way or another, has effectively a 
determination to be in one form or another; but with the 
precision of which does not necessarily follow, that an 
entity that has the property to be in one form or another, 
that entity is in one form or another 
When this principle is complied is produced named rule 
of characterization. If we have a system with the principle 
but not the rule of characterization, the system wills a 
weak Meingonian system. Instead a system with the 
principle and with a restricted version of the rule will be a 
strong Meingonian system. What cannot be is a system 
that having both and unrestricted both the full version of 
the principle as that of the rule; this system would be 
deliquescent, in it each sentence (syntactically well 
formed) would be both a thesis (asserted). But it is 
possible to have a treatment with both, rule and principle 
in its full and unrestricted versions. But it does not follow 
that do not fit but both treatments containing restricted or 
qualified versions. E.g. be a version according to which, if 
having the property A implies have the property B, then 
each entity will have one another. This may seem a simple 
tautology, but it is not demonstrable in the systems of 
first-order logic. Moreover, the treatment Meingonian 
weakly we are surmising could contain some much 
nuanced version of the rule of characterization, a version 
that would prevent the emergence of contradictions. 
Within a treatment so, arguably, if God is instituted or 
presented as having such and such characteristics, then He 
has effectively such features; but there will not continue 
necessarily having the features in question (although it 
may follow that in many cases).  
Then the sentence P = "X has the property of being in 
one form or another and has the property of not being in 
one form or another" is no real contradiction in the 
classical sense and does not move in terms of truth and 
falsity absolute. That phrase appears only real 
contradiction if we add the rule of characterization. This 
last rule makes adopt a Meingonian weak approach. 
Some of the adherents of this trend in contemporary 
logic investigate explicitly also its philosophical 
presuppositions and implications (Bueno, 2010; Carnielli 
and Marcos, 2001). Among other problems, the question 
of the relationship between the idea of paraconsistency 
and the traditional and/or contemporary forms of 
dialectical thinking is being examined. It seems to us that 
in the philosophy of paraconsistency a differentiation can 
be observed today. One of the tendencies, represented by 
Arruda (Arruda et al, 1980), da Costa (da Costa and Wolf, 
1980), Quesada (1989) while assessing highly important 
philosophical implications of the logic of paraconsistency, 
insists upon the view that paraconsistency is closely 
linked with the theory of logical calculi. The 
philosophizing logicians of this tendency give, as a rule, 
only modest hypothetical accounts of the relationship 
between paraconsistency and dialectic. The other tendency, 
represented by G. Priest (Priest, 1989, 1995, 1998; Priest, 
Routley, and Norman, 1989), dares to defend vehemently 
more radical and ambitious assumptions about the 
philosophical and scientific implications of paraconsistent 
logic, concerning not only the relation to dialectic, but 
also the conception of rationality in general. Let us have a 
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closer critical look at some main claims of the philosophy 
of paraconsistency from a special point of view, namely, 
from the point of view of secular (ontopraxeological) 
dialectic which aims at elaborating a theory of modern 
rationality taking inspiration from Hegel's critique of Kant 
and Marx's critique of Hegel. Needless to say, no simple 
reception of any philosophy of the past is able to cope 
with our contemporary problems of rationality. References 
to Kant and Hegel remain mostly mere decoration. Priest's 
use of the calculus-oriented notion of inconsistency in his 
interpretation of the so-called Kant/Hegel thesis about the 
inherently inconsistent nature of human reason seems to 
us to be misleading. Supposing we accept Kant's 
argumentation in his "Transcendental Dialectics" as a 
justification of the statement that our thinking is in its very 
nature (apparently, but necessarily) inconsistent: then 
Hegel's critique of Kant's antinomies should be taken as an 
attempt at a new consistency which corrects the antinomic 
dialectic of (apparent, but necessary) inconsistency of 
human reason in a section of its usage. The dictum of a 
unitary "Kant/ Hegel thesis" hides this difference.  
Following Priest, we will say that a logical system is 
paraconsistent, if and only if its relation of logical 
consequence is not "explosive", i.e., iff it is not the case 
that for every formula P and Q, P and not-P entails Q; and 
we will say a system is dialectical, iff it is paraconsistent 
and yields (or "endorses") true contradictions, named 
"dialetheias". A paraconsistent system enables to model 
theories which in spite of being (classically) inconsistent 
are not trivial, while a dialectical system goes further, 
since it permits dialetheias, namely contradictions as true 
propositions. Still following Priest, semantics of 
dialectical systems provide truth-value gluts (its worlds or 
set-ups are overdetermined); however, truth-value gaps 
(opened by worlds or set-ups which are underdetermined) 
are considered by Priest to be irrelevant or even improper 
for dialectical systems. Besides that, sometimes the 
distinction is drawn between weak and strong 
paraconsistency, the latter considered as equivalent with 
dialectics. A reader of recent literature in this field may 
have an impression that dialectics as strong 
paraconsistency is more a question of ontology than of 
logic itself, namely that it states the existence of 
"inconsistent facts" (in our actual world) which should 
verify dialetheias. One more introductory remark has to be 
put here: in recent literature of paraconsistency there are 
no quite unanimous, among paraconsistent logicians 
generally accepted distinction between paraconsistent and 
dialectical logical systems. But it remains an open 
question whether; semantically paradoxes express any 
"inconsistent facts". 
2.1. Coincidentia oppositorum in Mysticism: 
The Early Kabbalah Case 
The Kabbalists use the term, achdut hashvaah, to 
denote that Ein-sof, the Infinite God, is a “unity of 
opposites,” (Figure 1). 
Or as Scholem (1974, p. 88) at one point translates the 
term a “complete indistinguishability of opposites,” one 
that reconciles within itself even those aspects of the 
cosmos that are opposed to or contradict one another. 
Sefer Yetzirah, an early (3rd to 6th century) work which 
was of singular significance for the later development of 
Jewish mysticism, had said of the Sefirot (the ten 
archetypal values through which divinity is said to 
constitute the world) “their end is imbedded in their 
beginning and their beginning in their end.” (Kaplan, 
1997, p. 57). According to Yetzirah, the Sefirot are 
comprised of five pairs of opposites: “A depth of 
beginning, a depth of end. A depth of good, a depth of evil. 
A depth of above, a depth of below, A depth of east, a 
depth of west. A depth of north, a depth of south. The 13th 
century Kabbalist Azriel of Gerona was perhaps the first 
Kabbalist to clearly articulate the doctrine of coincidentia 
oppositorum. For Azriel “Ein Sof …is absolutely 
undifferentiated in a complete and changeless unity…He 
is the essence of all that is concealed and revealed.” 
(Azriel. 1966). According to Azriel, Ein-sof unifies within 
itself being and nothingness, “for the Being is in the 
Nought after the manner of the Nought, and the Nought is 
in the Being after the manner [according to the modality] 
of the Being… the Nought is the Being and Being is the 
Nought. (Scholem, 1987, p. 423). For Azriel, Ein-sof is 
also “the principle in which everything hidden and visible 
meet, and as such it is the common root of both faith and 
unbelief.” (Scholem, 1987, pp. 441-442). Azriel further 
held that the very essence of the Sefirot, the value 
archetypes through with Ein-sof is manifest in a finite 
world, involves the union of opposites, and that this unity 
provides the energy for the cosmos. The nature of sefirah 
is the synthesis of everything and its opposite. For if they 
did not possess the power of synthesis, there would be no 
energy in anything. For that which is light is not dark and 
that which is darkness is not-light. Further, the 
coincidence of opposites is also a property of the human 
psyche; “we should liken their (the Sefirot) nature to the 
will of the soul, for it is the synthesis of all the desires and 
thoughts stemming from it. Even though they may be 
multifarious, their source is one, either in thesis or 
antithesis.” (Azriel. 1966, p. 94). Azriel was not the only 
Kabbalist to put forth a principle of coincidentia 
oppositorum. The early Kabbalistic Source of Wisdom 
describes how God’s name and being is comprised of 
thirteen pairs of opposites (derived from the 13 traits of 
God enumerated in Chronicles), and speaks of a 
Primordial Ether (Avir Kadmon), as the medium within 
which such oppositions are formed and ultimately united.  
 
Figure 1. Representation of Ein-sof 
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The concept of achdut hashvaah figures prominently in 
the Lurianic Kabbalah, which became the dominant 
theosophical and theological force in later Jewish 
mysticism and Chasidism. Isaac Luria (1534-72) wrote 
very little, but his chief expositor, Chayyim Vital (1543-
60) records: Know that before the emanation of the 
emanated and the creation of all that was created, the 
simple Upper Light filled all of reality…but everything 
was one simple light, equal in one hashvaah, which is 
called the Light of the Infinite. (Zohar III, 113a. , Vol. 5, p. 
153). While Vital’s account suggests a unity of opposites 
in the godhead only prior to creation, a close examination 
of the Lurianic Kabbalah reveals a series of symbols that 
are applicable to God, the world and humanity, and which 
overcome the polar oppositions of ordinary (and 
traditional metaphysical) thought. Indeed, each of the 
major Lurianic symbols expresses a coincidence of 
opposites between ideas that are thought to contradict one 
another in ordinary thought and discourse. For example, 
Luria held that the divine principle of the cosmos is both 
Ein-sof (without end) and Ayin (absolute nothingness), 
that creation is both a hitpashut (emanation) and a 
Tzimtzum(contraction), that Ein-sof is both the creator of 
the world and is itself created and completed through 
Tikkun ha-Olam, the spiritual, ethical and “world 
restoring” acts of humanity, and, finally, that the Sefirot 
are both the originating elements of the cosmos and only 
fully realized when the cosmos is displaced and shattered 
(via Shevirat ha-Kelim, the Breaking of the Vessels). 
A closer examination of two key elements in the 
Lurianic system, Tzimtzum (concealment/contraction) and 
Shevirat ha-kelim (the Breaking of the Vessels) can 
provides further insights into the Lurianic conception of 
the coincidence of opposites. 
In the symbol of Tzimtzum (the withdrawal, 
concealment and contraction of the infinite that gives rise 
to the world) there is a coincidence of opposites between 
the positive acts of creation and revelation and the 
negative acts of concealment, contraction and withdrawal. 
For Luria, God does not create the world through a 
forging or emanation of a new, finite, substance, but rather 
through a contraction or concealment of the one infinite 
substance, which prior to such contraction is both 
“Nothing” and “All.” Like a photographic slide, which 
reveals the details of its subject by selectively filtering and 
thus concealing aspects of the projector’s pure white light 
(which is both “nothing” and “everything”), Ein-sof 
reveals the detailed structure of the finite world through a 
selective concealment of its own infinite luminescence. By 
concealing its absolute unity Ein-sof gives rise to a finite 
and highly differentiated world. Thus in the symbol of 
Tzimtzum there is a coincidence of opposites between 
addition and subtraction, creation and negation, 
concealment and revelation. In order to comprehend the 
notion of Tzimtzum, one simultaneously think two 
thoughts, for example, one thought pertaining to divine 
concealment and a second pertaining to (this concealment 
as) creation and revelation.  
For Luria, the further realization of Ein-sof is dependent 
upon a second coincidence of opposites; between creation 
and destruction, symbolized in the Shevirat ha-Kelim, the 
“Breaking of the Vessels.” Ein-sofis only fully actualized 
as itself, when the ten value archetypes which constitute 
the Sefirot are shattered and are subsequently restored by 
humankind (Tikkun ha-Olam). While Ein-sof is the source 
and “creator” (Zohar III, 113a. Vol. 5, p. 153). of all,Ein-
sof paradoxically only becomes itself, through a rupture 
which results in a broken and alienated world in need of 
humanity’s “restoration” and repair (Tikkun). For Luria, 
Ein-sof is propelled along its path from “nothing” (Ayin) 
to “something” (Yesh), through the creative and 
restorative acts of humankind; for it is only humanity 
acting in a broken and displaced world, that can undertake 
the mitzvoth, the creative, intellectual, spiritual and ethical 
acts that fully actualize the values and traits that exist only 
potentially within God. It is for this reason that the Zohar 
proclaims ”He who ‘keeps’ the precepts of the Law and 
‘walks’ in God’s ways…‘makes’ Him who is above.” 
(Zohar III, 113a. Vol. 5, p. 153). Thus, just as humanity is 
dependent for its existence upon Ein-sof, Ein-sof is 
dependent for its actual being upon humanity. The 
symbols of Ein-sof, Shevirah (rupture) and Tikkun (Repair) 
thus express a coincidence of opposites between the 
presumably opposing views that God is the creator and 
foundation of humanity and humanity is the creator and 
foundation of God. 
3. Contradiction and Deniers 
Let F be a non-countable set whose algebraic structure 
is at least that of a semi-ring. F is a semi-ring, a ring or a 
group.  
We lay the following definitions and fundamental 
axioms: 
Axiom 1: Any proposition P has a truth value p, 
element of a set E which is a part, not countable and 
stable for multiplication of the set F. 
Axiom 2: Any proposition P is endowed with a 
valuation [ ]0,1v∈  such that ( )v V p= , V reciprocal 
application of E on [ ]0,1  subject to the following 
conditions: 
1) ( )1 0 0,V − =  
2) ( ) ( ) ( )1 2 1 2,V p p V p V p=  
being p1 and p2 two truth values.  
Axiom 3: Truth value *p  denotes the negation or 
contradiction of P denoted as P¬  and ( )* 1V p p+ = . 
Let Pi be n propositions, i= 1,2,…, n of pi and *ip be the 
truth values of their contradictories. Then:  
Definition 1: A compound proposition (or logical 
coordination or logical expression) of order n is a 
proposition whose truth value c is a function nf  of pi and 
*
ip . 
 ( )* * *1 1 2 2, , , ,... ,n n nc f p p p p p p=  
nf  values in F; it determines a truth value if c E∈ . 
The condition of existence of a compound proposition 
defined by nf is c E∈ , or what is equivalent, 
( ) [ ]0,1V c ∈ . 
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Axiom 4: nf  is a polynomial in which each index 1, 
2,...,n must be at least once and that all coefficients are 
equal to unity. 
Definition 2: Let *p p u+ =  be. u is a denier of the 
proposition P if the following three conditions are fulfilled 
(Usó-Doménech, Nescolarde-Selva and Pérez-Gonzaga, 
2014): 
a). u E∈  
b). ( ) 1;V u =  u unitary truth value (from axiom 3) 
c). *u p p E− = ∈  (from axiom 1) 
Paraconsistent logic admits that the contradiction can 
be true. Then ( ) ( ) 21 1 1 0v P P p p p p∧¬ = − = ⇒ − − =  
2 1 0p p⇒ − + = . This equation has no real roots but 
admits complex roots 3
i
p e
π
±
= . This is the result which 
leads to develop a multivalued logic to complex truth 
values. The sum of truth values being isomorphic to the 
vector of the plane, it is natural to relate the function V to 
the metric of the vector space R2. We will adopt as 
valuations the norms of vectors. E is the set of complex 
numbers of modulus less or equal to 1 and the function V 
is such that ( ) 2V p p=  and it has satisfied axiom 2. 
Let P be a proposition of fixed truth value ip p e α= . 
If p = 0, α  is indeterminate, we agree to take 
0α = .According to definition 2, here a denier is a unitary 
complex number iu e ω=  such that 1u p− ≤ . Putting 
ϕ θ α= −  (Figure 2) this inequality entails cos
2
p
ϕ ≥ , 
be , arccos
2
p
ϕ θ θ≤ = . 
 
Figure 2. Circle of truth 
In summary  
 [ ], ; cos ; ,
2 3 2
p π π
ϕ θ θ θ θ  ∈ − = ∈   
 (1) 
Deniers u of P form a continuous set: the sector of the 
circle of truth (trigonometric circle) of angle 2θ  whose 
vector p is collinear to the bisector (Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Location of U: arc NPN'; NN’ mediatrix of OA 
A denier is determined by the angle ϑ . ( )u ϕ  is a 
bijective function. 
Contradictory proposition ¬P provides, fixed p, a 
continuous set of truth values ( ) ** , * * ip p p e αϕ = and 
then: 
 
* 1 ,1 ; 0 * 1 ;
* 1
p p p p
p
ϕ
ϕ θ
∈  −  = ⇔ = − 
= ± ⇔ =
 (2) 
Putting * *, * 2 ; 0ω α ϕ ϕ θ ϕ π θ ϕ− = = − ⇒ = − = ⇒  
* 0 * 2 ;ϕ ϕ θ π= ⇒ = −  in summary, 
 [ ] [ ]* 2 , 2 * ,ϕ θ π π θ ϕ ϕ θ π π θ∈ − − ⇒ − ∈ − −  (3) 
On the other hand we have * *α α ϕ ϕ− = − . 
The truth contradiction ( ) * 1v P P V pp∧¬ = =  
requires 1p = where
3
π
θ = ± and also * 1p = where 
3
π
ϕ = ±  and 2* , * *
3 3
π π
ϕ ϕ ϕ α α= ± − = ± = − .  
Solutions of ( ) 1v P P∧¬ =  are finally (Figure 4): 
ip e α= , α anyone; 
2
3*
i
p e
πα ± 
 = .  
 
Figure 4. 
Then, multivalued logic with complex truth values is 
paraconsistent. 
Another characteristic of paraconsistent logic is that the 
negation of the negation does not necessarily leads back to 
the original proposition as Hegel said. If 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )' , ' * ( );u u v P V u p V p v P v P≠ ¬¬ = − ≠ ¬¬ ≠ . 
8 American Journal of Systems and Software  
 
4. Conditions 
4.1. Condition 1 
It is written 1 2 1 2 1u u p p− ≤  with the above notation: 
 ( )1 2 1 2 1
ie p pϕ ϕ+ − ≤  
Condition 1 back to  
 ( ) 1 21 2cos 2
p p
ϕ ϕ+ ≥  
There is a continuous set of deniers ( )1 1u ϕ  and other 
deniers ( )2 2u ϕ  that that satisfy (eg 1 2 0ϕ ϕ+ = ). As well 
the 1 2P P¬ ∨¬  incompatibility exists, provides p1 and p2 
fixed, on a continuous set of truth values 1 2 1 2u u p p−  and 
we have: 
 ( ) ( )1 2 1 2v P P v P P¬ ∨¬ = ¬ ∧  
Similarly 1 2P P∨ does exist, provided that: 
 ( )
* *
1 2* *
1 2cos 2
p p
ϕ ϕ+ ≥  
satisfied, for example if 1 2 0ϕ ϕ+ = .  
Similarly the implication 1 2P P⇒ on condition that: 
 ( ) 1 2* *1 2cos 2
p p
ϕ ϕ+ ≥  
4.2. Condition 2 
Posing 1 2α α α− = , that 
2
1 2 1 2
ip p p e pα+ = +  it 
result that 1 2 1 2
20, 0, 1
3
p p p pπα∀ ≠ ∀ ≠ ≥ ⇒ + ≤ ; 
then 1 2
21
3
p p πα+ > ⇒ < . 
If 1 2 1p p+ > , which requires non-zero p1 and p2, 
complementarity 1 2P Pℑ  does not exist and 1 2P P¬ ℑ¬  
must exist. 
Theorem 1: Can be found deniers u1 and u2, such that 
*
1 2 1p p+ ≤ . 
Proof 
Just for this inequation is satisfied that * *1 2
2
3
π
α α− ≥ . 
After (4) ( ) ( )* * * *1 2 1 1 2 2α α ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ α− = − − − + . 
Let 20
3
π
α β≤ = −  be. After (3) the maximum value 
of *1 1ϕ ϕ− is 1 0π θ− > and the one of ( )*2 2ϕ ϕ− − is 
2 0π θ− >  and therefore 
 ( )* *1 2 1 2
2 5sup 2
3 3
π π
α α π θ θ β β− = − + + − > −  
because 1 2θ θ π+ < . 
The result is * *1 2sup α α π− ≥  since 
20
3
π
β≤ ≤ ; or 
sufficient condition is * *1 2
2
3
π
α α− ≥ . 
There is a continuous set of values of * *1 2α α− and 
therefore of deniers ( )1 1u ϕ  and ( )2 2u ϕ  which satisfy 
this condition. 
4.3. Condition 3 
It is written * *1 2 1 2 1p p p p+ ≤ . As condition 2, it is 
sufficient for it is fulfilled that the angle of non-zero 
vectors 1 2p p  and 
* *
1 2p p  is 
2
3
π
≥  therefore 
( )* *1 2 1 2 23
π
α α α α+ − + ≥  or else after (4) that: 
 * *1 1 2 2
2
3
π
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ− + − ≥  (5) 
or in according (3) 
 ( )* *1 1 2 2 1 2sup 2ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ π θ θ π− + − = − + >  (6) 
4.4. Condition 4 
It is written * *1 2 1 2 1p p p p+ ≤ . Studied by the same 
method it proves to be satisfied if (sufficient condition)  
 * *1 1 2 2
2
3
π
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ− + − ≥  (7) 
It is an inequation whose solution is the same of (5). 
The result is that concordance 1 2P PΞ  and discordance 
1 2P PΧ  can exist together; then one is the negation of the 
other by denier 1 2u u . 
5. Propositional Paraconsistent Algebra 
Propositional algebra can be built on the set of complex 
truth values. The main normal binary propositions are the 
following: 
1. Conjunction: 
 ( ) 2 2 21 2 1 2 1 2v P P p p p p∧ = =  (8) 
2. Incompatibility: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
22 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2,
iv P P u u p p e p p
v P P v P P denier u u
ϕ ϕ+ ¬ ∧¬ = − = −


¬ ∨¬ = ¬ ∧
 (9) 
3. Disjunction: 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )
2
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
2
2 1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2,
i
v P P u p u p p p
p e p e p p
v P P v P P denier u u
ϕ ϕ

 ∨ = + −


= + −


 ∨ = ¬ ¬ ∧¬
 (10) 
 American Journal of Systems and Software 9 
 
4. Implication: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )( )
2
1 2 1 2 1 2 2
2
1 2 2
1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2,
i i
v P P u u p u p
e p e p
v P P v P P denier u u
ϕ ϕ ϕ+

 ⇒ = − −


= − −


 ∨ = ¬ ∧¬
 (11) 
5. Concordance:  
 
( )
( )
( ) ( )( )
2
1 2 1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
2
1 2 2 1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
2
2
,
i i i
v P P u u u p u p p p
e p e p e p p
v P P v P P denier u u
ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ+

 ⇔ = − − +


= − − +


 ⇔ = ¬ Χ
 (12) 
6. Discordance: 
 
( )
( ) ( )( )
2
1 2 2 1 1 2 1 2
2
2 1
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
2
2
,
i i
v P P u u u p p p
p e p e p p
v P P v P P denier u u
ϕ ϕ

 = + −


= + −


 = ¬ ⇔


 (13) 
7. Complementarity: 
 ( ) ( )
22 1 2
1 2 1 2 1 2
iv P P p p p e pα α−ℑ = + = +  (14) 
8. Inverse complementarity:  
 
( )
( ) ( )
2
1 2 1 2 1 2
2
1 21 2
1 2
ii i
v P P u u p p
e p e e pα αϕ ϕ−
¬ ℑ¬ = + − −
= − + −
 (15) 
9. Equivalence: 
 ( ) ( )
22 1 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 2
i iv P P p u p p e e pα α ϕ−℘ = + − = + − (16) 
Here intervenes the angle 1 2α α−  of vectors 1 2,p p . 
Seek what deniers should be chosen so that if 
( ) ( )1 2v P v P= , that is to say, if 1 2 1 2,p p p α α= = ≠ , 
we have: ( ) ( )2 1 1 21v P P v P P℘ = = ℘ . 
We then: ( ) ( ) 222 1 1 iiv P P p e e ϕα℘ = − +  where 
1 2α α α= − . So that ( )2 1 1v P P℘ = , the necessary and 
sufficient condition is:  
 2sin sin2 2
pα αϕ − = 
 
 (17) 
Similarly, for ( )1 2 1v P P℘ =  the necessary and 
sufficient condition is:  
 1sin sin2 2
pα αϕ + = 
 
 (18) 
of which 1 2 2,ϕ ϕ ϕ= solution of (17).  
Figure 5 shows the geometric representation: 
 
Figure 5. The geometric representation 
5.1. Normal Propositions of Order n 
1. Conjunction: 
 ( ) 21 2 1 2... ...n nv P P P p p p∧ ∧ ∧ =  (19) 
2. Incompatibility: 
 ( )
( )
2
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
... ... ...
... ( ... )
n n n
n n
v P P P u u u p p p
v P P P v P P P
¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ∨ ¬ = −
¬ ∨ ¬ ∨ ∨ ¬ = ∧ ∧ ∧
 (20) 
3. Disjunction: 
 ( )
( ) ( )
2* * *
1 2 1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2
... ... ...
... ...
n n n
n n
v P P P u u u p p p
v P P P v P P P
∨ ∨ ∨ = −
∨ ∨ ∨ = ¬ ∧¬ ∧ ∧¬
 (21) 
4. Complementarity: 
 ( ) 21 2 1 2... ...n nv P P P p p pℑ ℑ ℑ = + + +   (22) 
5. Inverse complementarity:  
 ( )
2
1 2
1 2
1 2
...
...
( ... )
n
n
n
u u u
v P P P
p p p
+ + +
¬ ℑ¬ ℑ ℑ¬ =
− + + +
 (23) 
6. Paraconsistent Boolean Logic 
It is the Boolean reduction of strong paraconsistent 
logic; modules of complex truth values there can be only 0 
or 1. The circle of truth is there reduced to its center and 
its circumference. Although Boolean, this logic differs 
radically from the classical logic: it remains paraconsistent. 
The contradiction can be true there. We may have verified 
all the normal binary propositions that the propositional 
algebra of the paraconsistent Boolean logic contains well 
beyond the classical logic as a special case. 
Since ( ) ( )0 1v P v P= ⇒ ¬ = , *p  indeterminate and 
( ) 0v P P∧¬ = .  
Since ( ) 1
3
v P πθ= ⇒ = ± . Since *p  must be 
Boolean ϕ  can only take two values: 
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0 0 0
1 1
3
v P v P P
v P v P P
ϕ
π
ϕ
= ⇔ ¬ = ⇒ ∧¬ =
= ± ⇔ ¬ = ⇒ ∧¬ =
 (24) 
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It has always: * * 2ϕ ϕ α α ϕ= − ⇒ − = . 
1. Conjunction: The truth table of the conjunction is 
identical to that of classical logic. 
2. Disjunction: From (10), it is false if 
( ) ( )1 2 0v P v P= =  and true if ( )1 0v P =  and ( )2 1v P =  or 
if ( )1 1v P =  and ( )2 0v P = .  
Condition 1 is written ( )* * *1 2 1cos ;2ϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ+ ≥ = −  thus 
the disjunction exists only if 1 2 ,0,3 3
π π
ϕ ϕ+ = − ; we have: 
( ) 2 11 2 1i iv P P e eϕ ϕ∨ = + −  then: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
1 2 1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
1 2
0 ,
3 3
1
,
31
0
v P P if
v P v P
if
v P P
or
π π
ϕ ϕ
π
ϕ ϕ
ϕ ϕ
∨ = = ± = ±
= = ⇒
+ = ±
∨ =
= =










(25) 
Hence the truth table of disjunction (Table 1): 
Table 1. Truth table of disjunction P1∨P2  
 P1   
P2  1 0 
 1 1/0* 1 
 0 1 0 
Not conform evaluation to the classical logic is indicated by *. 
It coincides with that of classical logic, in case 
( ) ( )1 2 1v P v P= = , is chosen 1ϕ  and 2ϕ  such that 
1 2 0ϕ ϕ = .  
3. Implication: From (11) is true if ( )2 1, 0p v P∀ = . If 
( ) ( )1 2 1v P v P= =  the condition of existence is 
( )1 2
1
cos
2
ϕ ϕ− ≥ ; such as ( ) ( )
2
1 2 2
1 2 1
i iv P P e eϕ ϕ ϕ+⇒ = − + , 
were ( )1 2 1v P P⇒ =  in all cases permitted by the 
condition of existence except where 1 2 3
π
ϕ ϕ= = ±  for 
which ( )1 2 0v P P⇒ = . If ( )1 1v P =  and ( )2 0v P =  were 
( ) ( )11 2 1 21 ; 0iv P P e v P Pϕ⇒ = − ⇒ =  if 
( )1 1 20, 1v P Pϕ = ⇒ =  if 1 3
π
ϕ = ± . 
Hence the truth table of implication (Table 2): 
Table 2. Truth table of implication P1⇒P2  
 P1   
P2  1 0 
 1 1/0* 1 
 0 0/1* 1 
It coincides with that of classical logic if one rejects the 
case ( ) ( )1 2 1v P v P= =  the choice 1 2 3
π
ϕ ϕ= = ± and the 
case ( )1 1v P =  and ( )2 0v P =  the choice 1 3
π
ϕ = ± .  
These rejections are required to conduct a rigorous 
deduction in paraconsistent Boolean logic: the 
fundamental articulation of the deduction is indeed true 
implication denoted⇒ , that if P1 is true requires true P2. 
4. Concordance: From (12) is true if ( ) ( )1 2 0v P v P= = . 
If ( )1 1v P = and ( )2 0v P = then 
2
1
1 2( ) 1
iv P P e ϕΞ = −  
therefore 1 2( ) 0v P PΞ =  if 1 2( ) 1v P P⇔ =  1 0ϕ =  and 
1 2( ) 0v P PΞ =  if 1 3
π
ϕ = ± ; same if ( )1 0v P = and 
( )2 1v P =  we have 1 2( ) 0v P P⇔ = if 2 0ϕ =  and 
1 2( ) 1v P P⇔ =  if 2 3
π
ϕ = ± . If ( ) ( )1 2 1v P v P= = the 
concordance does not exist when 1 2,3 3
π π
ϕ ϕ= ± = ± , but 
it is true in all other cases. 
Hence the truth table of concordance (Table 3): 
Table 3. Truth table of concordance P1⇔P2 
 P1   
P2  1 0 
 1 1 0/1* 
 0 0/1* 1 
It coincides with that of the equivalence of classical 
logic if when ( )1 1v P =  and ( )2 0v P =  is chosen 1 0ϕ =  
and when ( )1 0v P =  and ( )2 1v P =  is chosen 2 0ϕ = .  
Importantly, to conduct a rigorous reasoning with these 
choices, the concordance becomes identical to the 
deductive equivalence. 
7. Reflections 
The argument concerning belief systems may be 
circumvented if one claims that ordinary belief is not 
deductively closed. That is, at least, controversial, but an 
ideal reasoner should aspire to closure. Considering the 
case of a paraconsistent system being used as a meta-
language to analyze a belief system, it is also the task of 
paraconsistent logic to define paraconsistent 
contradictions, that is, contradictions that are so 
threatening to this belief system that they really 
compromise rational inference-making within the belief 
system. This “bad” kind of inconsistency can be 
quantitative (too many classic contradictions may be a 
sign that even paraconsistency cannot save the belief 
system) or qualitative - that is, the classic contradiction in 
question is so strong (for example, a proof that all 
statements of the belief system can be proved both true 
and false) that it is also a paraconsistent contradiction, a 
contradiction that even a paraconsistent logician cannot 
accept. This argument implies the idea that the set of 
paraconsistent contradictions is a subset of the set of 
classic contradictions and that is indeed a rather intuitive 
idea. But we cannot think of any conclusive argument 
against the existence of a paraconsistent contradiction that 
is not a classic contradiction, so this idea is only a 
plausible conjecture.  
To appreciate the significance for metaphilosophy of 
the recent developments in paraconsistent logic showing 
how, within formal systems, contradictory propositions 
can be held simultaneously without trivialization. The 
scientificist conception of the search for truth is partly 
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motivated and partly justified by the ancient rejection of 
all contradictions. But this rejection is no longer a logical 
imperative. Indeed, it cannot be endorsed without, at least, 
severe qualifications that rob it from its argumentative bite. 
Thus the way will be open to adopt a novel understanding 
of the search for truth. And we shall present a model that 
conceives it as the determination of the range of legitimate 
answers to a given question (without precluding answers 
that, to an extent, contradict each other). 
Rescher's objection to syncretism in metaphilosophy 
stems from his belief that because of its readiness to 
embrace all different answers to a given question, it is 
bound to hold contradictory answers. But this, according 
to Rescher, is not rationally acceptable. It is tantamount to 
destroying the cognitive nature of philosophy, its 
aspiration to constitute a search for truth: "To accept a 
plurality of answers is not to have answers at all; an 
unending openness to a variety of possibilities, a constant 
yes-and-no leaves us in perpetual ignorance". (Rescher, 
1995. p. 350; cf p. 344.) The variety of metaphilosophical 
pluralism here outlined rejects this view. And, in order to 
understand why it does, we must now evaluate the validity 
of two logical arguments that have traditionally being used 
to uphold it.  
According to the first, the inclusion of contradictory 
propositions within the same conceptual space is ruled out 
by the principle of contradiction. The second is a formal 
argument known since the Middle Ages (ex absurdo 
sequitur quodlibet), which in contemporary symbolic 
logic becomes the proof that from the simultaneous 
assertion of two contradictory sentences everything can be 
deduced. (Hilbert and Ackermann, 1928) During the 20th 
century, however, a growing body of formal developments 
called paraconsistent logic, which in the last decade 
became a leading topic in logico-mathematical research, 
has critically undermined this view.  
Deductive logical systems can incorporate some 
contradictions. And they can be articulated without 
thereby necessarily causing the disruption of the 
inferential structure as a whole. A paraconsistent logical 
system can serve as the underlying logic that allows the 
formalization of a theory including some inconsistencies 
within its postulates (or, indeed, in the consequences 
derivable from them) without thereby trivializing itself. 
Although paraconsistent logical systems are as consistent 
as the classical ones, they can support some contradictions 
when they formalize a non-purely logical theory. A recent 
research line within paraconsistent logic that seeks the 
unification of mutually inconsistent theories (such as, 
paradigmatically, classical and quantum mechanics) is 
especially important for present purposes. The basic 
strategy of this research line comprises two steps. In the 
first, the aim is to formalize each theory presenting some 
extralogical postulates that can characterize them, using a 
logical system (which can be classical logic) as the 
underlying logic. In the second step, the aim is to 
articulate these deductive systems in a global theory that 
will contain their extralogical postulates, but using as 
underling logic a paraconsistent system. Although no 
attempt will be made here to formalize philosophical 
theories (we are, after all, merely sketching a research 
program the development of which would include it), this 
application of paraconsistent logic to the metatheoretical 
reflection about science suggests applying a similar 
strategy to metaphilosophy. The rejection of positions, 
such as Multilevel Pluralism (MLP) that are prepared to 
hold several answers to a question can no longer be 
sustained on logical grounds alone. Speaking about logical 
impossibilities requires specifying the logic we are talking 
about, for such impossibility does not hold for all 
deductive systems.  
In this way, the logical objection to a metaphilosophical 
pluralism that is prepared to accept a diversity of answers 
at the individual level is completely dissolved. Pluralism, 
therefore, becomes equally acceptable both at the 
disciplinary and the individual level.  
Paraconsistent logic was in some sense born of the 
realization that consistency, in its classical sense, was not 
a good enough criterions to discriminate between good 
and bad belief system, exactly because our actual 
reasoning is, it seems, much more able to cope with 
inconsistent premises than classical logic. Indeed, it has 
become a motto in many circles of non-classical logic that 
classical logic simply is not an accurate model of human 
rationality.  
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ANNEX A 
We will represent in the following table a comparison 
between three logics: classical (CL), quasi-paraconsistent 
(QPL) (Usó-Doménech, Nescolarde-Selva and Pérez-
Gonzaga, 2014) and strong paraconsistent (SPL). 
Table 4. Truth table of principal normal binary propositions 
Notation Name 
CL truth values 
{ }1 2, 0,1p p ∈  QPL truth values [ ]1 2, 0,1p p ∈  SPL truth values [ ]1 2, 0,1p p ∈  
1 2P P∧  Conjunction 1 2p p  1 2p p  2 21 2p p  
1 2P P¬ ∨ ¬  Incompatibility 1 21 p p−  1 2 1 2u u p p−  ( )1 2 1 2ie p pϕ ϕ+ −  
1 2P P∨  Disjunction 1 2 1 2p p p p+ −  2 1 1 2 1 2u p u p p p+ −  
2
2 1
1 2 1 2
ip e p e p pϕ ϕ+ −  
1 2P P⇒  Implication 1 1 21 p p p− +  ( )1 2 1 2 2u u p u p− −  ( ) ( ) 21 2 21 2i ie p e pϕ ϕ ϕ+ − −  
1 2P P⇔  Concordance 1 2 1 21 2p p p p− − +  ( )1 2 2 1 1 2 1 22u u u p u p p p− + +  ( )
2
1 2 2 1
1 2 1 22
i i ie p e p e p pϕ ϕ ϕ ϕ+ − − +  
1 2P P  Discordance 1 2 1 22p p p p+ −  2 1 1 2 1 22u p u p p p+ −  
2
2 1
1 2 1 22
i ip e p e p pϕ ϕ+ −  
1 2P Pℑ  Complementarity 1 2p p+  1 2p p+  ( )
2
1 2
1 2
ip e pα α− +  
1 2P P¬ ℑ¬  Inverse complementarity 1 22 p p− −  * *1 2p p+  ( ) ( )
2
1 21 2
1 2
ii ie p e e pα αϕ ϕ−− + −  
2 1P P℘  Equivalence 1 21 p p+ −  1 2 2p u p+ −  ( )
2
1 2
1 2
i ip e e pα α ϕ− + −  
1 2P P℘  Inverse equivalence 1 21 p p− +  1 1 2u p p− +  
( ) 21 1
2 1
i ip e e pα α ϕ− + −  
 
